A new framework for making sourcing decisions regarding low-volume, high-complexity products by Grotsky, Dan Moshe, 1971-
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR MAKING SOURCING DECISIONS
REGARDING LOW-VOLUME, HIGH-COMPLEXITY PRODUCTS
by
Dan Moshe Grotsky
B.Sc., Industrial Engineering, Tel-Aviv University, 1997
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management and the
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degrees of
Master of Business Administration
and
Master of Science in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
in conjunction with the
Leaders For Manufacturing Program
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
December 2001
@ 2001 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
All rights reserved.
Signature of Author
Sloan School of Management
Deparjment of Electrical Engigeering and Computer Science
Certified by
Professor Stephen C. Graves, Thesis Advisor
Sloan School of Management
Certified by
Plofessor Joel Moses, Thesis Advisor
Department of Electrical Engineerjn,,j5aComputer Science
Accepted by
Margaret Andrews, Execu ive Director of the Master's Program
_MI Sloan $Qhool ofrUnagement
Accepted by
Arthur C. Smith, Chairman, Departitent Committee on Graduate Students
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
LBRARIEBARKER
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR MAKING SOURCING DECISIONS
REGARDING LOW-VOLUME, HIGH-COMPLEXITY PRODUCTS
by
Dan Moshe Grotsky
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management and the
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
on December 21, 2001
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degrees of
Master of Business Administration
and
Master of Science in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
ABSTRACT
Compaq Computer Corporation's High Performance Systems Business Unit (HPSBU)
manufactures a series of high-end computer servers called Alpha Servers. These servers are
manufactured in relatively low volumes, typically for large institutions that require complex
computer systems - either rapid number processing, as in scientific applications, or massive data
processing, as in large database applications. They are mostly custom-configured for each
customer, each server specifically assembled, and each system specifically configured to meet
each customer's needs.
As computer manufacturing processes become more standardized, and computers almost
commoditized, it becomes impractical to manufacture all system components in-house. To that
extent, Compaq has gradually outsourced more and more of the functions, which, combined, are
necessary to deliver finished product to Compaq's Alpha Server customers. For instance, as
computer manufacturing technology progressed, it quickly became evident, that keyboard
manufacturing can, and should, be outsourced to a contract manufacturer, which can achieve
economies of scale and produce large quantities of standard keyboards at minimal cost. On the
other extreme, Compaq has made sure to keep most of its core competencies in-house, in order to
preserve its competitive advantage. The key question faced by Compaq today is which functions
to preserve in-house, and which to outsource.
A new conceptual model for making this make or buy decision is presented. The purpose of this
model is to raise the numerous issues at stake when considering outsourcing of a particular
function, specifically when dealing with low-volume, high-complexity products, such as the
Alpha Server. This model provides Compaq with a structured method of analyzing the various
components that make up the finished product delivered to the customer, and deciding which
need to be maintained in-house, which should be outsourced, and which of those can be
outsourced. Initial model implementation was performed on the latest Alpha Server product
family, dubbed Miracle for the purpose of this document.
Thesis Advisors:
* Stephen C. Graves, Abraham J. Siegel Professor of Management & Engineering Systems,
Chair of MIT Faculty
* Joel Moses, Institute Professor, Professor of Computer Science and Engineering, Professor of
Engineering Systems
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I. Introduction
1. Project Description
Compaq Computer Corporation's High Performance Server Business Unit (HPSBU) is struggling
to make structured, comprehensive, objective sourcing decisions regarding various components
that make up the Alpha Server. Compaq must consider a myriad of strategic and tactical
motivations for and against outsourcing, resulting in a daunting decision process. In addition, low
volumes make manufacturing of Alpha components unattractive to potential contract equipment
manufacturers (CEMs). Finally, the high level of complexity of many of the components
significantly limits the number of real outsourcing options available to Compaq.
The decision support model presented was developed by combining the works of various research
papers and books from industry and academia in a novel manner. Its primary goal is to help
Compaq make these decisions by providing a structured decision-making framework, as
illustrated in Figure 1. Of course, this framework may be useful for other companies
contemplating sourcing decisions regarding low-volun-e, high-complexity products as well.
This structured framework achieves three significant goals:
* The model necessitates examination of each sourcing decision in the perspective of the
entire Alpha Server system as viewed by the customer, not as a self-contained decision
regarding one specific component.
" The model places each component or function that is required to complete the product at
the same level of consideration. This includes functions that would not necessarily appear
in a bill of materials, such as product marketing or design.
* The model takes both strategic and tactical goals into consideration.
7
(1) Hierarchical Definition of Functions
Required to Produce a Finished Product
(4) Sourcing
ecisions
Figure 1 - The sourcing decision model presented consists of four steps: (1) Hierarchical
representation of the functional product components, (2) Identification of core competencies, (3)
Consideration of sourcing alternatives, and finally (4) The sourcing decisions themselves.
However, it is important to note that the model does not provide one conclusive, objective
sourcing decision for each component. Rather, it should be used as a framework in which to
consider make or buy decisions, not as a magic formula for solving these complex decisions. To
that extent, the last step in the model, the sourcing decision, still requires a significant amount of
subjective, managerial consideration. Different managers may come to different sourcing
decisions using the same data and the same model, but such is the nature of a complex system.
There simply is no one correct or optimal solution, and this framework merely helps present a
comprehensive list of criteria to be considered in order to achieve an educated, calculated, and,
hopefully, successful solution.
Implementation of this model has begun at Compaq, as it relates to the newest family of Alpha
Servers, dubbed Miracle for the purpose of this thesis (see Appendix 2: Initial Model
Implementation).
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2. Project Selection
The project described herein has evolved significantly over the course of the one-year LFM
internship at Compaq. At first, it seemed as if the most serious issue on the agenda was Compaq's
newly forged relationship with one particular Contract Equipment Manufacturer (CEM). Indeed,
this was Compaq's first attempt to outsource the manufacturing of a complex component called a
Printed Circuit Assembly (PCA). In addition to relatively normal labor pains, such as problems
that stemmed from lack of formalized communication between Compaq and its new supplier,
Compaq found itself having to deal with global fluctuations in material supply, driving lead times
for standard, simple components from days to months. This bitter experience ultimately led
Compaq management to the decision to rebuild in-house manufacturing capacity for PCAs and
subsequently discontinue the outsourcing relationship they worked so hard to establish.
Simultaneously, Compaq was experiencing quality problems from a supplier of fans for certain
processor drawers. Despite the fact that the root cause was a simple fuse mismatch, Compaq
found their supplier unresponsive, and was forced to replace entire fan systems for lack of a better
fuse - or a better supplier relationship.
The High Performance Server Business Unit (HPSBU) was, just three years ago, a division of
Digital Equipment Corporation, which was acquired by Compaq Computer Corporation in 1998.
One outcome of this acquisition was a conflict of different corporate cultures. Regarding sourcing
issues, Digital management was traditionally much more hesitant to outsource than was
Compaq's. Historically, Digital once manufactured all components of its entire product line in-
house, as a matter of principle. As time progressed, so did computer manufacturing technology,
and Digital resorted to outsourcing the manufacturing of relatively standard components to
contract manufacturers that had started to spring up like wildflowers.
Compaq, however, largely depended on these CEMs right from the start. As a high-volume PC
manufacturer, Compaq had much to gain from developing long-term, high-volume relationships
with these suppliers. The CEMs, on the other hand, manufacture these components in even higher
volume, and supply these commodity components to multiple computer vendors, taking
advantage of economies of scale that one single vendor could never achieve on its own.
After Compaq's acquisition of Digital, HPSBU began to adjust to Compaq's outsourcing
strategy. However, HPSBU's low-volume, high-complexity systems posed different issues than
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those which led Compaq management to its outsourcing strategy, and the make / buy decision
was not as trivial as Compaq believed it to be.
Project selection was based on a combination of Compaq's concerns listed above, as well as
academic interest. The project was designed to be both useful for Compaq management, and
educational, interesting, and beneficial for others faced with make / buy decisions in low-volume,
high complexity manufacturing environments. The framework presented provides a novel method
for contemplating the make / buy decision, by bringing both strategic and tactical issues to light.
While each element or step of the model is based on previous research, as referred to specifically
in each section of the thesis, the model framework represents a new approach to the make / buy
decision.
Where Compaq is concerned, the model deals with the issues described above, whether directly
or indirectly. Specific examples of potential model implementation at Compaq are presented as
well.
3. Glossary
Activity-Based Costing (ABC) - Activity-based cost systems emerged in the mid-1980s to meet
the need for accurate information about the cost of resource demands by individual products,
services, customers, and channels. ABC systems enabled indirect and support expenses to be
driven, first to activities and processes, and then to products, services, and customers. The
systems gave managers a clearer picture of the economics of their operations.!
Alpha Server - A high-end computer server manufactured by Compaq Computer Corporation.
Alpha Servers are designed to run Compaq Tru64 UNIX, Linux, or Windows NT operating
systems, and are sold primarily for data-intensive applications or massive processing needs.
Appropriability - The environmental factors, excluding firm and market structure, that govern
an innovator's ability to capture profits generated by an innovation. The most important
dimensions of such a regime are the nature of the technology (whether product or process, tacit or
codified) and the efficacy of legal mechanisms of protection (patents, copyrights or trade
secrets).2
Kaplan, Robert S. & Cooper, Robin, Cost & Effect: Using Integrated Cost Systems to Drive
Profitability and Performance
2 Teece, David J., "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration,
collaboration, licensing and public policy"
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Complementary Assets - Capabilities or assets necessary to be able to successfully
commercialize an innovation, such as marketing, competitive manufacturing, or after-sales
support. Complementary assets may be generic or specialized.
Contract Equipment Manufacturer (CEM) - These are the suppliers of components,
equipment, and services to end product vendors, or OEMs. CEMs typically provide their products
and services through long-term contracts, with the understanding that they waive branding rights.
Example: Solectron Corporation.
Complexity - Complexity is defined by Boppe (2000) as "a measure of the difficulty we have
working with something.. .Complexity typically increases when the number of attributes or
situations that exist simultaneously increases." MIT Institute Professor Joel Moses, an advisor for
this work, presents a similar definition of complexity as "the number of interconnections between
the parts coupled with the intricacy of these connections", in a memo entitled "Complexity and
Flexibility". He asserts that complexity is not "bad" - rather it is the currency to achieve real goals
of a system such as functionality, efficiency and flexibility. However, if too much complexity has
to be expended to achieve these goals, the system becomes increasingly less usable.
The words "complex" and "complexity" are used in this thesis in two different contexts:
* Complexity of the entire supply chain system in which Compaq is engaged.
* Complexity of some of the components that comprise the Alpha Server.3
Component - For the purpose of this thesis, a product component is defined, in the most general
sense, as any function or physical part that is necessary in order to provide finished product to the
end customer. Examples: a printed circuit board, product branding, transportation, quality control
system, etc.
Core Competencies - The innovative combinations of knowledge, special skills, proprietary
technologies, information, and unique operating methods that provide the product or the service
that customers value and want to buy.4
HPS - This acronym is sometimes used to refer to HPSBU, Compaq Computer Corporation's
High Performance Server Business Unit.
3 This complexity does not constitute a complex system in the systems engineering sense; rather,
it is an indication of the difficulty of designing and manufacturing the component, and is defined
as the number of interconnections between the parts coupled with the intricacy of these
connections, in this case physical interconnections on the part itself.
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HPSBU - Compaq Computer Corporation's High Performance Server Business Unit. Based in
Marlboro, Massachusetts, this business unit, previously a division of Digital Equipment
Corporation, is responsible for the Alpha Server line of products.
LCM - HPSBU's Lifecycle Management Group, n6e Product Lifecycle Group. LCM is the
group within HPSBU that supported the internship project associated with this thesis. LCM owns
responsibility for the supply chain lifecycle of the various Alpha Server models, from design
conception, through first revenue shipment (FRS) and volume production, to end of life, when a
model is phased out of the market to make room for the next improvement to the Alpha series.
Leaders For Manufacturing (LFM) - The dual-degree program at MIT within which the
internship that led to this thesis took place. LFM is a graduate-level academic and research
program sponsored by MIT's Sloan School of Management, the School of Engineering, and over
20 Industry Partners. LFM is part of the Engineering Systems Division, which develops academic
and research programs that reflect the integrative aspects of engineering, complement traditional
engineering science strengths and enable students to better understand complex systems. LFM's
mission is to discover and codify guiding principles for manufacturing; to educate leaders for
manufacturing companies; to infuse important principles and technologies into global
manufacturing practice; and to improve the manufacturing excellence of its partner companies.
Linux - An open-source computer operating system that holds 3% of the market share for servers
worldwide5 . Linux started as a "flavor" of UNIX, though was never supported by a specific
software vendor. Rather, Linux is developed by volunteer contributors worldwide in an open
source strategy.
Make / Buy Decision - A term that pertains to the sourcing decision of a certain part or function.
Make relates to the decision to manufacture or otherwise accomplish a task or function in-house,
i.e. within the organization. Buy implies outsourcing the component or function to a contract
manufacturer or other service company.
Miracle - A disguised code name for the newest platform of Alpha Servers. The Miracle family
is designed to replace all existing Alpha platforms.
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)- The product vendor that brands and sells the end
product, albeit through the help of equipment manufacturers and suppliers, CEMs, that are under
4 Greaver, Maurice, Strategic Outsourcing
5 IDC, March 2001
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Operating System (O/S) - The core software at the heart of every computer system that allows
other higher-level software applications to access resources such as files, directories, memory,
processors, etc. Examples: UNIX, Windows, Windows NT, Linux, VMS, MVS, Palm-OS, etc.
Outsourcing - The act of transferring some of an organization's recurring internal activities and
decision rights to outside providers, as set forth in a contract.
In other words, when an OEM outsources work to a CEM, that OEM sets up a contract with the
CEM in order to provide products and/or services to the OEM on a recurring basis.
PC - Personal Computer. The term Personal Computer was first used by International Business
Machines (IBM) as a name for the computer that marked IBM's 1981 entry into the market for
desktop computers (This market was previously dominated by Apple, Commodore, and Tandy,
companies that had been marketing personal computers under other names since about 1975).
Today, the PC platform represents the largest market segment of computer sales worldwide.
Printed Circuit Assembly (PCA) - A printed circuit board that is fully loaded with appropriate
components. Sometimes referred to simply as modules, PCAs are the building blocks of computer
hardware. PCAs range in complexity from relatively simple Operating Control Panel PCAs,
which are used to control the basic on/off switch elements of the computer, to highly complex
central processing unit (CPU) PCAs, upon which processors are placed to operate the main
processing of the computer.
Printed Circuit Board (PCB) - A raw card containing electronic circuitry that, after placements
of numerous electronic components, operates as a printed circuit assembly. Printed circuit boards
are not generic; rather they are designed and manufactured to serve in specific printed circuit
assemblies.
Server - A computer capable of supporting software applications on remote computers. Servers
typically reside in central locations on the network, and are typically stronger machines used to
support numerous applications or users on a computer network.
6 Greaver, Maurice, Strategic Outsourcing
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UNIX - A computer operating system that holds 48% of the market share for servers worldwide7 .
The term UNIX is used to refer to various similar operating system "flavors" (e.g. Compaq's
Tru64, Sun's Solaris, IBM's AIX, and HP's HP-UX), based on software vendor.
Windows NT - A computer operating system sold by Microsoft that holds 23% of the market
share for servers worldwide.
7 IDC, March 2001
8 IDC, March 2001
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II. Project Setting and Background
1. Company Background, Position and Outlook
"Compaq Computer Corporation, a Fortune Global 100 company, is a leading
global provider of technology and solutions. Compaq designs, develops,
manufactures, and markets hardware, software, solutions, and services,
including industry-leading enterprise computing solutions, fault-tolerant
business-critical solutions, and communications products, commercial desktop
and portable products, and consumer PCs that are sold in more than 200
countries. "9
As hinted in the quote above, Compaq Computer Corporation, headquartered in Houston, Texas,
is one of the largest computer manufacturers in the world. It offers a complete line of computer
products covering the entire price spectrum: from digital assistants and personal computers to
large enterprise servers.
Recently, a new corporate vision was unveiled, stating that Compaq will bring "Everything to the
Internet". To that extent, new marketing plans were laid out, and the corporate strategy has
evolved. Specifically, in June 2001, toward the end of the internship that led to this thesis,
Compaq declared a strategic alliance with Intel Corporation, whereby Compaq will phase out of
the Alpha microprocessor altogether, and will instead base all future products on Intel's Itanium
chip. More on this initiative is discussed in the thesis conclusion.
2. Compaq's High Performance Server Business Unit
The work associated with this project was conducted at Compaq's Marlborough, Massachusetts
facility and was sponsored by the High Performance Systems Business Unit's Lifecycle
Management (LCM) Group, which has supply chain lifecycle management responsibility for
Compaq's Alpha Server series. This group became part of Compaq after the 1998 acquisition of
Digital Equipment Corporation by Compaq.
9 "Compaq at a Glance", http://www.compag.com/corporate/ataglance.html, August 8, 2001
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For the most part, the HPSBU has not changed, culturally or administratively, as a result of this
acquisition. To that extent, Compaq has left HPSBU's work methods and processes intact, and
has managed to preserve employee loyalty to the core business unit. While this tactic proved
successful at the business unit level, several cultural and strategic differences are apparent at the
corporate level. These differences seldom erupt as internal conflicts, but more often expose
different managerial styles, opinions about corporate strategy, or new work methods. Discussing
and resolving these differences with an open mind leads to process improvement and strategy
evolution. The difference in sourcing strategy views within corporate Compaq and within
HPSBU emerged as an opportunity to question the essence of the decisions that make up the
sourcing strategy. In many ways, this thesis is the result of this improvement process.
3. Compaq's Alpha Server
Figure 2 - Compaq's Alpha Server, in a GS320 configuration.
Compaq's Alpha Servers are some of the fastest, most powerful computer systems on the planet. Used
primarily by large organizations in need of heavy floating-point number calculations or intensive
data processing, Alpha Servers support applications such as the Celera Genomics' role in the
human genome project and the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center, a joint effort of Carnegie
Mellon University and the University of Pittsburgh together with the Westinghouse Electric
Company. In addition to such high profile, computing-intensive applications, Alpha Servers
provide significant value as application servers in businesses and other institutions, running their
information systems on Compaq's Tru64 UNIX, Microsoft's Windows NT, or Linux operating
systems.
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III. Past Research and Industry Trends
1. Outsourcing Research
Extensive research has been conducted over the past two decades regarding sourcing strategy and
the make / buy decision. Though the framework presented herein is novel, most of the elements
that comprise this framework are directly derived from various industrial and academic sources.
However, little reference is made in the literature to the specific concerns of the sourcing decision
in low-volume or high-complexity environments. Many of the factors that are considered primary
reasons to outsource in high-volume systems are different or simply not relevant in low-volume
environments. Other factors are almost trivial to implement when dealing with simple
components, yet become difficult or even infeasible when dealing with complex components.
The model presented herein is based on current research regarding outsourcing initiatives 0 ,
primarily in, but not limited to, manufacturing companies. Specifically, in orderto build a
framework for consideration of Compaq's make / buy decision, the most important factors were
those that involved the motivation behind outsourcing initiatives and the stumbling blocks of
those initiatives, once they were decided upon.
Many researchers agree that the motivation behind outsourcing is closely coupled with the
concept of core competencies", which is discussed at length. Generally speaking, it is considered
a strategic mistake to outsource a core competency, and thus one must first determine the
organization's core competencies, before making any make / buy decisions.
10 Greaver, Maurice, Strategic Outsourcing; Anderson, David, "The Seven Principles of Supply
Chain Management"; Fine, Charles, ClockSpeed; Brtck, Felix, "Make Versus Buy: The Wrong
Decisions Cost"; Fine C. & Whitney D., "Is the Make-Buy Decision Process a Core
Competence?"; Stuckey, John and White, David, "When and When Not to Vertically Integrate"
" Greaver, Maurice, Strategic Outsourcing; Fine C. & Whitney D., "Is the Make-Buy Decision
Process a Core Competence?"; Rosenfield, Donald. Notes from "15.769 Manufacturing Strategy"
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In addition, the following criteria, compiled from various sources (see VI Bibliography), were
determined relevant for sourcing decision consideration, specifically when considering
outsourcing of a non-core competency:
* Financial criteria: These include both variable and fixed costs that are affected by the
sourcing decision.
" Operational criteria: These include changes in logistic systems, relationships with
suppliers, and the effects of fluctuations in supply and demand.
* Strategic criteria: These include other long-term issues, such as company focus,
reputation, and employee retention and motivation.
2. Recent Trends in Outsourcing
The following figure illustrates the recent increase in outsourcing worldwide. As effective,
inexpensive, inter-enterprise communication becomes commonplace, transportation and logistics
systems improve, and services industries become more consolidated, companies are able to take
advantage of these advancements in order to focus on their core competencies and outsource non-
core functions.
Outsourced Functions
Manufacturing 44 o
Transportation & Distribution 56%
o Marketing 38%
U Information Systems 4E/o4-C
Human Resources 60%
General & Administrative
Finance & Accounting 9%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
% of Companies Outsourcing
0 Long-term (prior to 1994) N Recent (since 1994)
Figure 3 - The proportions of various functions being outsourced by companies.
(Source: American Management Association, 1997)
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Among manufacturing companies, outsourcing is a growing trend as well, and component
production has become the most commonly outsourced function, as shown below:
Manufacturing Functions Outsourced
0
(U U-I- ~
Product Design
Product Assembly
Packaging
Component Production
Component Design
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
% of Manufacturing Firms
Outsourcing
5 Long-term (prior to 1994) E Recent (since 1994) U Planned
Figure 4 - The proportion of outsourcing of various functions within manufacturing companies.
(Source: American Management Association, 1997)
Moreover, the following chart shows that outsourcing of these manufacturing functions is
typically achieved by maintaining multiple suppliers:
Single / Mulitple Sourcing of Mfg.
Functions
Product Design -*
Product Assembly -1
0
Packaging
u- Component Production 2
Component Design
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
% of Companies Outsourcing the
Function
ESingle Provider ElM ultiple Providers
Figure 5 - Manufacturers typically maintain multiple suppliers when outsourcing.
(Source: American Management Association, 1997)
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The primary reasons behind outsourcing among manufacturing companies are cost and time
reductions:
Outsourcing Goals Among
Manufacturers
Quality Improvement
Time Reduction0
Cost Reduction o -/
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Goals Realized
lmn Full EIn Part NNot at All nNo Answer
Figure 6 - Primary goals for outsourcing initiatives among manufacturing companies.
(Source: American Management Association, 1997)
The outsourcing trend is accentuated among electronics manufacturers, as shown below:
Electronics Contract
Manufacturing
160 - 20
140
120 15 Electronics
100 .o Contract
80 10 W Mfg.
60 4 Industry
40 5 Revenue
20 .w+ % of OEM's
0 ~0 COGS
1998 2003
Year
Figure 7 - Expected growth of outsourcing budgets as a percentage of cost of goods sold among
electronics manufacturers.
(Source: Forrester / Technology Forecasters, May, 2000)
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IV. Sourcing Decision Model
1. Introduction
The following model describes a framework of a suggested thought process to be used when
contemplating sourcing or make / buy decisions for Alpha Server components. This model is
based on the combination of industry and academic research, as well as specific Compaq needs
and considerations. It was designed as a generic model, however, which could be useful for most
any company contemplating the make / buy decision, and probably most helpful for those
manufacturing companies faced with specific problems in outsourcing low-volume, high-
complexity components, as is Compaq. The model structure (see IV. 1.b Model Overview), as
well as its focus on issues that arise in low-volume or high-complexity manufacturing
environments, is what constitutes the model's novelty.
a. Assumptions
The following initial assumptions are established in order to build a generic, strategic model:
1. The Alpha Server platform, as a whole, constitutes a competitive advantage for Compaq, as a
product that provides unique value to Compaq's customers.
2. Customers will continue to base their buying decisions on criteria similar to those that they
use today.
3. Compaq currently has variable in-house manufacturing capability, which may, at a
measurable cost, be diverted to other activities, expanded, or eliminated altogether.
4. Several contract manufacturers also have variable manufacturing capability, which can be
bought by Compaq in an outsourcing contract.
5. Compaq wishes to provide customers with an end-solution, consisting of hardware, basic
system software, and optional integration services.
12 A process of core competency assessment, similar to that described herein regarding
component-level core competencies, could be conducted ahead of time at a corporate level across
Compaq products in order to determine which products are indeed core competencies. In this
case, the working assumption is that the Alpha Server is a core competency, and therefore
provides competitive advantage to Compaq.
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b. Model Overview
The model should be applied iteratively to each component or function that is performed in order
to supply finished product to the customer, in a top-down manner. These components include
both physical component manufacturing as well as more intangible elements, such as product
design or distribution. In other words, the product, in its entirety, is first analyzed in order to
determine a hierarchy of components and sub-components. Then, each component is analyzed
separately, starting with the entire finished product, and ending with the nuts-and-bolts that make
up the system. However, fear not - entire sub-systems will be exempt from further analysis upon
determination of sub-system outsourcing, rendering the whole process practical.
The following steps constitute the process to be conducted for each component, and are described
at length in the following chapters:
1. Core competency assessment
2. Analysis of alternative solutions for non-core functions
3. Evaluation of alternative solutions
4. Sourcing decision
The following bar is used throughout the model description to help the reader keep track of the
various steps of the model framework - The relevant step is highlighted in the beginning of each
section.
Core Competency Alternative Solution Alternative Solution Sourcing
Assessment Analysis Evaluation Decision
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However, while discussion of these steps in the thesis is serial, model implementation is not. The
following diagram illustrates how these steps are meant to be implemented:
Analyze components
of finished product
Product components
defined as a hierarchy
Is the component Yes
a core
competency?
No
Analyze alternative
sourcing solutions
Evaluate alternative
sourcing solutions
Sourcing decision
Figure 8 - Flowchart of overall sourcing model process.
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2. Core Competency Assessment
Core Competency Alternative Solution Alternative Solution Sourcing
Assessment Analysis Evaluation Decision
a. Definition
Before delving into the subject of core competencies, a proper definition of the term is in order:
Core competencies are 3
"... the innovative combinations of knowledge, special skills, proprietary technologies,
information, and unique operating methods that provide the product or the service that
customers value and want to buy."
* "...what sets the organization's products and services apart from competitors' similar
offerings."
* ... not 'fleeting [or] easily imitated"
In other words, a competency can be considered core only if it satisfies two criteria:
1. It must provide a competitive advantage; i.e. it must contribute to creation of a product or
service that customers see as distinguishably valuable and unique to the company.
2. It must be a sustainable competency.
13 Greaver, Maurice, Strategic Outsourcing
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b. Product Component Hierarchy
Figure 9 illustrates a sample product component hierarchy at its highest level. Each component is
broken down into sub-components, unless an outsourcing decision is already made for that
component. If an activity-based costing (ABC) method is implemented, this can help define the
product component hierarchy, since the breakdown to specific activities is quite similar to this
approach. Furthermore, costing data collected through ABC can then be used for evaluating the
financial criteria discussed below. For the purpose of this thesis, a product compment is defined,
in the most general sense, as any function or physical part that is necessary in order to provide
finished product to the end customer. Examples: a printed circuit board, product branding,
transportation, quality control system, etc.
Product Component Hierarchy
Figure 9 - A sample high-level product component hierarchy diagram.
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c. Core Competency Identification
Outsourcing a core competency essentially means giving up a sustainable business method or
function that directly provides unique value to the customer, and handing that business over to
another company instead. Therefore, by identifying core competencies, one eliminates those
functions as potential for outsourcing, thereby mitigating the risk of losing valuable business to
contract manufacturers or other service providers. The only functions exposed to this risk are
non-core competencies, which, by definition, do not contribute to unique customer value over the
long haul in any case.
The following flowchart (Figure 10) describes the process of identifying core competencies, and
should be applied to each function, or component within the product component hierarchy (as
described in Figure 9):
Figure 10 - Core competency assessment process flowchart: Non-necessary functions should be
eliminated; Necessary non-core functions can potentially be outsourced; Core competencies should
be regarded as sustainable revenue generators, and thus should be maintained, fostered, and
guarded as crown jewels.
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d. Examples
1. In a typical manufacturing company, the accounting department is crucial to the long-term
survival of the company. However, when customers contemplate which product to buy,
accounting competencies are rarely considered a factor, nor do they directly contribute to
such a factor. To that extent, accounting methods, while necessary to the survival of the
company, would not be considered a core competency, because they do not fulfill the first
requirement - they do not contribute to unique customer value.
2. Let us consider another, less obvious example. WidgetWare Corp. has an extremely efficient
quality control system. As a result of this system, WidgetWare was able to cut costs by a
factor of 30%, and quality levels increased by 70%, far above competitors' offerings. One
would think that WidgetWare's quality control system must, therefore, be a core competency.
However, that is not necessarily true. If customers are, perhaps, indifferent to the increased
level of quality offered by WidgetWare, then their increased quality levels do not offer unique
customer value. In addition, if WidgetWare's prices were not affected by the lower costs, then
customers did not receive value in this respect either. If no unique customer value was gained
by implementing the quality control system, then that system cannot be considered a core
competency.
3. In that case, one might say, assuming the customer in the previous example did appreciate the
value of the increased level of quality in WidgetWare's product, the quality control system
could be considered a core competency. However, this statement is not necessarily true
either. Let us assume that two key employees are responsible for the quality control system in
its entirety. Their method and work processes are not documented, nor do their coworkers or
superiors understand their function. Or, alternatively, what if the quality control system
consists of a generic software package that was bought off-the-shelf for $199.99? In both
cases, the appropriability of this function is considered weak. A competitor, Better Widgets
Corp., could easily acquire this competency, either by hiring these two individuals, or by
purchasing this software. This would render the competency of no unique value to the
customer, because Better Widgets would then offer comparable value as well. In this
example, the competency is said to be unsustainable, and therefore is not a core competency
either.
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4. In another example, Mobile Widgets, Inc. has developed a new type of cellular phone that is
significantly less expensive than other phones on the market, because it operates on a new
communication protocol, for which Mobile Widgets has a patent. Mobile Widgets believes it
has strong appropriability for this product as a result. However, when trying to penetrate the
cellular market, Mobile Widgets finds it necessary to contract with wireless communication
carriers, in order to begin deploying the product. It can be said that Mobile Widgets is
dependent upon specialized complementary assets that are owned by the carriers, namely
their relationship with their customer base and their ability to provide wireless
communication service. Mobile Widgets would be wise to partner with such a carrier in order
to commercialize their defendable technology, for without these complementary assets
Mobile Widgets would not be able to achieve market penetration.
3. Alternative Solutions for Non-Core Functions
Core Competency Alternative Solution Alternative Solution Sourcing
Assessment Analysis Evaluation Decision
Once the core competencies are identified, and unnecessary functions are eliminated, the
remaining components in the product component hierarchy are said to be non-core competencies.
In the iterative process of drilling down through the product component hierarchy, these non-core
competencies are the functions that should be considered for outsourcing. Outsourcing these
functions carries minimal risk of conceding long-term value to contractors, since all functions that
provide such value are, by definition, considered core competencies. In other words, limitation of
outsourcing potential to non-core competencies ensures preservation of those functions that
provide sustainable unique customer value.
However, it is not always feasible or advisable to outsource every non-core function. First,
alternative solutions to in-house functionality must be assessed and compared with in-house
solutions. When evaluating alternative solutions, it is appropriate to weigh the benefits and
drawbacks of each alternative in regard to several critical factors, including, but not restricted to,
cost. The following list of factors includes most major potential benefits and drawbacks of
outsourcing a particular function, and can be used as a "checklist" for evaluating each sourcing
alternative. The criteria are divided into three primary categories based on financial, operational,
and strategic relevance.
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a. Financial Criteria
Miguel Miciano, an LFM intern at Compaq in 1999, conducted a thorough analysis of financial
criteria to be used for considering sourcing alternatives, in his thesis titled "A Tool for Sourcing
Decisions". In his work, Miciano developed a comprehensive financial planning tool, based on
Microsoft Excel, especially for conducting such cost-based decisions. The purpose of this work is
not to "reinvent the wheel", so to speak, rather to provide some of the financial criteria as food for
thought to be considered when looking at sourcing alternatives.
In a low-volume or high-complexity manufacturing environment, it is particularly important to
differentiate between the fixed and variable costs associated with the production of each
component. This is due to the fact that "fixed" plant, property, and equipment costs tend to be
proportionally higher than in high-volume or low-complexity scenarios. Accordingly, sourcing
solutions that have an effect on fixed resource allocation entail thorough financial analysis of
relevant cost drivers.
(1) Activity-Based Costing
Breaking the finished product down to product components and functions allows us to look at the
various activities involved in the entire production process. The activities-based costing (ABC)
method similarly relates to activities and raw materials that make up the entire cost of the
product. This paper does not go into depth describing ABC methodology, which can be found in a
wide variety of accounting textbooks (perhaps the most commonly used is Kaplan and Cooper's
"Cost and Effect", included in the bibliography of this thesis). Data derived from this cost
analysis can help in performing capital budgeting analysis on the various alternatives for each
function, since ABC allocates costs separately to each such function.
In this analysis, we will need to make certain assumptions about the future environment and its
effect on these costs, in order to project the costs over the next few years. These assumptions
include production volumes, product mix, inflation rates, labor rates, etc. The cost projections
related to in-house production are then compared to the costs of the various outsourcing
alternatives. Depending on the volatility and the impact of the assumptions made, sensitivity
analysis may also be useful for these projections. For instance, if prices of raw materials depend
on a shaky supplier, and that cost represents a significant portion of the overall cost of the
function in question, sensitivity analysis based on the existence of that supplier, or on the cost of
that material, is in order.
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Miguel Miciano's LFM thesis work provides a tool that could be used efficiently in this capacity.
ABC data can be used in the "input worksheet", and then the optimization framework suggested
can be used to find the short-term costs associated with each sourcing alternative for the
component.
(2) Capital Investment
Outsourcing allows OEMs to essentially turn fixed costs into variable costs. For example, by
outsourcing manufacturing capability, production lines or even entire facilities can be closed
down, sold, or transferred to production of other products. The plant, property, and equipment
(PP&E) expenses, which are considered fixed costs, are thus eliminated. However, prices
negotiated with contract manufacturers typically include these costs, as they are factored into the
CEM's prices. In this manner, the fixed PP&E costs are "exchanged" for variable costs, paid to
the CEM for services rendered.
It is often convenient to assume that outsourcing does not have an effect on such fixed costs,
unless they are indeed eliminated, as described above. However, in most cases, this assumption is
inaccurate. If the fixed assets are not specialized to one specific function, or are otherwise utilized
as a result of outsourcing, this extra value should be taken into consideration. Moreover, Theory
of Constraints (ToC)14 would suggest, that if the total throughput can be increased as a result of
this increased resource capacity, then the added value of that freed capacity is equal to the entire
increase in throughput. See IV.3.b(5) Fixed Resource Capacity for more information about the
value of alleviating capacity constraints.
(3) Capital Budgeting
In order to quantitatively evaluate the financial impact of the make or buy decision of a specific
component, it can be helpful to consider each component as a separate project, and each sourcing
alternative as an alternative to project execution. Capital budgeting analysis takes both the
variable and the fixed costs described in the previous two criteria into account in order to
compare the various alternatives. These criteria are discussed separately above, because it is
important to be able to evaluate the impact an alternative has on fixed costs regardless of variable
costs and vice-versa. However, the overall combined comparison obtained through capital
budgeting is useful to get a feel for the combined cash flows of each alternative.
14 Goldratt, Eliyahu M., The Goal: A Process of Ongoing Improvement.
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The simplest way to go about capital budgeting is to conduct a discounted cash flow (DCF)
calculation, taking real options into account. Free cash flows are calculated as follows:
FCF = OPx(1-T)+DxT -I-AWC
where:
FCF = free cash flow
OP = operating profit, or gross cash flow
D depreciation
Tc tax rate
I = investment
WC = net working capital (or inventory)
The net present value of an alternative equals:
T E(FCF.)
NPV = I '
j=1 (1+ r)'
i.e., the sum of the expected free cash flows over time, discounted according to the discount rate,
r. In order to account for real options, the expected value of free cash flows must take the
different possible outcomes of the alternative into account, including project deferral, project
abandonment, or growth. See Appendix 1: Capital Budgeting Example.
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Generally speaking, when contemplating an alternative that contains a significant element of risk,
the following matrix is a useful way to think about the value of that alternative as a function of its
expected net present value and its associated risk:
Net present value
0
0d
0
0|
+
Figure 11 - Alternative Assessment based on Capital Budgeting with Real Options
b. Operational Criteria
(1) Time To Market
Outsourcing can have a significant impact on the period of time that elapses from product
inception to first revenue shipment. This time to market is particularly relevant to technology
intensive products, which are typically characterized by short lifecycles. For example, if Product
X has a two-year product lifecycle, then a one-month delay in time to market of Product X will
cause a decrease of over four percent ( ) to the bottom line, assuming a constant revenue
2*12
flow throughout the lifecycle. This assumption proves to be quite conservative, considering the
fact that revenue is usually higher in the initial stages of the product lifecycle.
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Figure 12 - Product lifecycle of Product X.
In this example, Product X has a lifecycle of two years. Since the end-of-life stage is typically
determined by external market conditions and the competitive landscape, its timing is independent of
the market introduction (first revenue shipment). Thus, delays in product ramp-up have a
significantly detrimental effect on Product X's bottom line.
However, it is not always obvious whether time to market will increase or decrease as a result of
outsourcing. The effect depends largely on the manufacturing capabilities in-house and within the
potential suppliers, on the information flow between the OEM and the CEM, and on the incentive
alignment between the different organizations.
If, for instance, in-house capabilities in procurement or production ramp-up are considered
stronger than those of contract manufacturers, then in-house manufacturing might lead to shorter
time to market, and vice-versa. Regarding high-complexity products, product-specific in-house
manufacturing processes tend to be superior to those which can be obtained elsewhere. To that
extent, prospective contract manufacturer learning curves must be taken into consideration.
More often than not, information flows between various business units within the organization are
more efficient than those between an OEM and a CEM. Communication breakdowns between the
supplier and the OEM can be quite detrimental to product lead times in the short term and to
product lifecycles in the long term. However, internal communications issues have been known to
arise in manufacturing organizations as well, typically between engineering and manufacturing. If
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these information flows are as weak as proposed inter-organizational ones, then in-house
manufacturing loses this particular advantage.
Finally, incentives of manufacturing and engineering, wherever they may be (i.e. internal or
external), must be aligned. Quite often, when dealing with external manufacturers, conflicts of
interest may arise. For instance, such conflicts may lead to swifter handling of one competitor's
order over that of another. Another example manifests itself in times of material shortage;
contract manufacturers must choose among their clients or otherwise "ration" these materials and
the products they comprise. This factor, when not carefully handled, could have a detrimental
effect on time to market as well.
(2) Logistics
Site specificity15 might be a significant determinant in the sourcing decision. For example,
refineries are typically located near mines, in order to reduce transportation costs. In such a case,
though numerous buyers and sellers may exist in the market, logistics costs or times may deem
most options infeasible. This leads to a virtual oligopoly, based on location and access, which
often can eliminate the luxury of choosing a sourcing alternative altogether.
In less extreme cases, site location may still be a determining factor, if logistics costs or times
provide a significant advantage of one alternative over another.
(3) Inventory
Inventory carrying costs can severely impede a poorly planned supply chain. Different sourcing
decisions entail different inventory capacities, lead times, and availability, thus it is important to
estimate the effects that each alternative has on inventory carrying cost. When analyzing these
costs, it is recommended to estimate the inventory carrying costs throughout the supply chain, and
not just the costs that appear on one company's books. Despite the fact that outsourcing can help
improve an OEM's cost structure by mitigating the risk of carried inventory through hubs
established and owned by the suppliers, this risk, and the cost associated with its mitigation, still
has an impact on the chain as a whole. The cost is merely shifted to a different channel.
Therefore, when assessing the value of different inventory carrying options, one must consider
whether the supply chain as a whole benefits from the option. For instance, if, by vertically
15 Site specificity is a term coined in Stuckey and White's "When and When Not to Vertically
Integrate", and refers to a situation in which buyers and sellers locate fixed assets in close
proximity to minimize transport and inventory costs.
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integrating with a supplier, only one buffer stock needs to be held (in one facility) instead of two
(one in each facility), this is a certain benefit to the supply chain. However, if vertical integration
maintains two facilities and two separate buffers, this integration has done nothing to save
inventory carrying costs.
The more complex a component, the more sub-components it has, the more suppliers of those
sub-components are involved, and the deeper the supply chain tends to be. Since each supplier
adds value to the component along the way, complex components are also associated with
relatively high inventory carrying costs. Robust supply chain design, involving modular activities
conducted in parallel, can often reduce the depth of this chain, and, in turn, the inventory carrying
cost of the complex component.
Numerous optimization models have been developed to analyze inventory carrying costs across a
supply chain. Companies such as 12 Technologies and Manugistics offer such software packages,
and Compaq owns the rights to an internally developed system with comparable capabilities,
known as "The Optimizer".
(4) Quality
Sourcing decisions can have a huge impact on quality rates. This issue becomes especially tricky
when considering low-volume, high-complexity components. On the one hand, low-volume
OEMs can typically benefit from pooled resources that CEMs provide. In this manner, contract
manufacturers, focused on manufacturing a specific component in relatively large quantities, can
often achieve higher quality rates. Such economies of scale can lead to more efficient or precise
work processes, or the ability to invest in quality control systems, for example.
On the other hand, CEMs are set up to provide high-volume service. Low-volume orders typically
generate less revenue, and therefore receive less attention. A CEM that manufactures PCBs in
high volume for the exploding cellular phone market sets quality standards, which are appropriate
for $10 PCBs, used in $100 cellular phones. While it might make perfect sense to replace 1% of
the defective phones as a result of low quality boards, high-end servers, which may cost over
$1,000,000 per unit, cannot be readily replaced should a $10 PCB prove defective.
In addition, when considering complex components, sometimes contract manufacturers simply
cannot provide the competencies required to manufacture the component within the expected
quality metrics. In such cases, the contract manufacturer progresses on a learning curve. The
OEM must take this into consideration, and anticipate lower quality levels at first.
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(5) Fixed Resource Capacity
Fixed resource capacity can also have a bearing on the sourcing decision. It is not always clear
how to distribute fixed plant, property, and equipment costs in the financial analysis of the
various sourcing options. When considering these costs, one must look at the opportunity cost of
one sourcing alternative versus another. If outsourcing the manufacturing of one small component
does not seem to have an impact on fixed costs, one should ask if the fixed resources were
utilized to their maximum or not. If they were, constraint theory 6 would suggest that outsourcing
the component might free one or more fixed resources in favor of another constrained operation,
thus increasing throughput and revenue. This additional revenue should, in this case, be added to
the benefits of this option.
Such opportunity cost calculations tend to have a larger impact in low-volume scenarios. When
dealing with low volumes, fixed resources are typically underutilized, making overhead costs
relatively high. Reallocation of fixed resource capacity in this case may have a significant impact
on bottleneck management, as well as on the bottom line. SeeIV.3.a(3) Capital Budgeting for
more information on how to calculate the financial impact of these real option decisions.
(6) Economies of Scale
If contract manufacturers can effectively pool their resources in order to provide products to
numerous OEMs, they can potentially benefit from economies of scale. This point is particularly
relevant to low-volume manufacturing. For instance, Boeing, a low-volume airplane
manufacturer, may require a part identical to another that could be found in a car. Let us assume
that Delphi manufactures this part for General Motors in high volumes. It stands to reason that
Delphi could manufacture this part at far lower cost than Boeing ever could, due to higher
leverage with suppliers, more efficient volume-oriented manufacturing processes, and better
equipment utilization. If this is indeed the case, Boeing might better procure the part from Delphi
instead of manufacturing it in-house.
However, the large size of an organization or production volume does not always entail benefits
of economies of scale. These efficiency improvements can only be gained if the larger scale can
be successfully leveraged to achieve process improvement, cost reductions, or other logistical
benefits.
16 Goldratt, Eliyahu M., The Goal: A Process of Ongoing Improvement.
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c. Strategic Criteria
(1) Focus
When all is said and done, every company should have a focus, a mission, and a goal. Conveying
a clear vision that is focused on one outcome helps companies achieve that outcome. Employees
relate to the focus and concentrate their efforts to achieve the goal. Clients associate the company
with its vision, and thus a clear, focused vision helps brand the company as well. Strategic focus
determines core competency development, and, in turn, core competency identification helps
mold business strategy.
Sourcing decisions are strategic by nature, and thus are ultimately determined by business
strategy, yet they also help create that strategy. Outsourcing non-core competencies is a method
of announcing to the world - both internal and external to the organization - what the vision of
the organization is. By choosing which functions to keep in-house and which to outsource, a
company acts upon strategic goals, clarifies those goals publicly, and helps thse goals evolve.
(2) Flexibility
OEMs often outsource manufacturing functions in order to gain flexibility. Outsourcing
companies can react quickly to changes in the business environment, because they are not
invested in fixed resources, rather their suppliers are. By switching from one supplier to another,
an OEM can swiftly take advantage of new technologies that might take years to develop in-
house.
In addition, instead of relying on one internal source, outsourcing companies can pick and choose
solutions from multiple suppliers, and "play" one against the other, or simply keep one supplier
as a "back-up" in case the main supplier does not live up to its promises. See Figure 5 on page 19.
Unfortunately, when considering complex low-volume production, multiple sourcing could pose
a difficult problem, and is sometimes even an infeasible option. This is due to the lack of truly
competent suppliers available to fill the function in question, as well as the lack of interest in
dealing with low volume production.
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(3) Control
Issues such as project scheduling, internal coordination and cooperation, and bridging the gap
between functional teams are simpler and more effectively handled, by and large, when functions
are kept in-house. There is a certain level of trust an OEM must place in the CEM in order to
work together effectively. Ultimately, however, the make alternative clearly gives the OEM more
control over the process than does the buy alternative. This is due to the fact that the CEM, by
definition, ultimately reports to its own stockholders, and not to the OEM (contrary to the
"customer always comes first" myth). Thus, when process control is a critical element of the
function in question, it is recommended to keep the function in-house. If outsourcing is the
chosen alternative, on the other hand, one must pay careful attention to information flows
between the supplier and the OEM on all levels, to ensure maximal communication, which is the
next best alternative to total control.
(4) Double Marginalization
When all is said and done, profit is the one factor that motivates each company in the value chain.
By this rationale, the more fragmented the value chain, the more profit-takers exist within that
chain, and the less efficient the chain overall. Thus, outsourcing can cause value chain
inefficiencies by increasing the number of profit-takers, which typically increases the end-product
cost. This phenomenon is called double marginalization, and is important to factorinto the final
cost analysis when contemplating a sourcing decision.
In an efficiently aligned supply chain, suppliers along the channel will divide the entire supplier
surplus in the form of profit throughout the chain. The existence of multiple competing channels
drives these profit margins down, across the chain. However, low-volume, high-complexity
products tend to be characterized by relatively unique channels, due to the novelty of such
products. Thus, competition is low, supplier surplus is high, and profit margins tend to be higher,
though more dynamic, across the chain. Double marginalization that may occur due to
outsourcing in such a chain could indeed raise overall channel costs, thus decreasing supplier
surplus. However, this strategy may still be beneficial overall, if other criteria, such as those
described herein, provide other advantages. Thus, double marginalization is typically a more
critical concern in more competitive, commodity-like products.
38
(5) Employees
The make/buy decision also encapsulates a human resources issue. If a function is outsourced as
of one point in time, what is the fate of the faithful employees who took care of that function to
date? Can their efforts be diverted to a core competency? Will competitors hire them and gain
competitive advantage? Will massive layoffs create a distasteful environment, either within or
outside of the organization?
When dealing with complex systems, this question takes on an additional facet: If the outsourcing
strategy backfires for some reason, the OEM may not be able to revert to the in-house option, due
to lack of available skilled employees. Training new employees would be expensive at best, and
perhaps impossible within competitive time constraints.
Due to these situations, the employee criterion is frequently a factor that has a binary outcome
regarding the feasibility in the make/buy decision - either outsourcing of the component is
feasible or not feasible in terms of human resource issues.
(6) Market Perception
Market perception is not only relevant to assessment of core competencies (seeIV.3.c(1) Focus);
it also matters when looking into the make/buy decision for non-core functions. First, it is
necessary to estimate the market perceptions regarding the function at hand, and companies'
capabilities within that function, for each alternative. In other words, when contemplating
manufacturing of a certain widget, one must compare the market's reaction to in-house
manufacturing versus manufacturing at supplier X. Partnering with companies that have widely-
recognized market recognition for a certain function can go a long way to boost a company's
market perception, and vice versa. If a company has a poor reputation as a manufacturer, and is
better known as a system integrator for instance, perhaps a press release announcing the
outsourcing of manufacturing to a strong production shop could improve the market's perception
of that company as a whole.
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(7) Technology Strategy
When assessing technology-intensive functions, technology strategy research 7 would suggest
consideration of two key factors: appropriability and complementary assets. The following
definitions explain these terms:
Appropriability - The environmentalfactors, excluding firm and market
structure, that govern an innovator's ability capture to profits generated
by an innovation. The most important dimensions of such a regime are
the nature of the technology (whether product or process, tacit or
codified) and the efficacy of legal mechanisms ofprotection (patents,
copyrights or trade secrets).'8
Complementary Assets - Capabilities or assets necessary to be able to
successfully commercialize an innovation, such as marketing,
competitive manufacturing, or after-sales support. Complementary assets
may be generic or specialized.
By assessing the positioning of a company's technology regarding these two factors, one can
conclude the next logical step in the preferred strategy to bring that technology to market or
maintain a significant market position. The rationale behind this is that a company can sustain
successful marketing of a technology if the company has cornered the intellectual property behind
it and can somehow access the complementary assets necessary to connect that company to the
market. If one of these factors is weak, the company should somehow find a way to fill the gap.
Technology strategy analysis of this kind is especially relevant when dealing with products
involving high complexity, since the intellectual property involved in creating such products
typically has significant value, and is not readily reproducible.
For instance, Compaq's Alpha servers are based on the Alpha chip, a high-performance
microprocessor that is designed and owned by Compaq. This defendable, heavily-patented
intellectual property represents strong appropriability. Together with Compaq's access to
complementary assets, such as manufacturing capacity and strong sales and distribution
capabilities, Compaq can, and indeed does, bring the Alpha chip technology to market
successfully. Compaq's recent decision to discontinue support of the Alpha chip and instead base
17 Murray, Fiona. Notes from "15.393 Technology Strategy"; Teece, David, "Profiting from
Technological Innovation"
18 Teece, David, "Profiting from technological innovation"
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the Alpha platform on Intel's Itanium chip significantly reduces Compaq's appropriability
regarding chip technology. In order to maintain Compaq's market share, the company must
develop and defend appropriability in other aspects of the system as a whole (e.g. marketing,
software, etc). By leveraging Compaq's strong positioning regarding complementary assets, such
as reputation, loyal client base, marketing savvy, etc., Compaq can maintain market share while
developing such new appropriability.
The following matrix describes the value of a function based on these two factors:
Por ostini g grIg Godstning regarding access
access to cop eAy assets complementary assets
Strong Technology is defendable, but Function is both sustainable and
appropriability commercialization is a challenge commercially viable.
without access to complementary
assets.
Weak Function cannot provide Complementary asset positioning sb1
appropriability sustainable value. be utilized to company's advantage
(wh e t rouse capabilit,
tactors) in order to sect
makeshar beforecompetitiontak
adv of weak appropriability.
Table 1 - Assessing the value of a technology-intensive function based on the concepts of
appropriability and complementary assets
At this stage of the process, analysis of alternative solutions for non-core competencies, we are
dealing with functions that are not sustainable, unique competitive advantages. This being the
case, exposure of the technology to competitors is not a strategic concern. If this is not the case,
and there are reasonable concerns about appropriability, we must go back and reassess if this
function is indeed a non-core competency.
On the other hand, however, much can be gained by taking advantage of cutting-edge
technologies available on the market that might make this function more efficient, or give the
component higher levels of quality or functionality. To that extent, by outsourcing to the most
advanced supplier, the OEM stays on top of technology advancements.
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The flowchart presented in Figure 13, taken from Teece's "Profitingfrom technological
innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy", describes a
formal method for the make / buy decision, based on the appropriability regime and the
complementary asset positioning. The notion of contracting for access relates to the act of
forming alliances with other companies that have access to relevant complementary assets.
Start
Innovation requires Commercialize
access to 0 immediately.
comnlementarv assets
Yes
Complementary assets
specialized.
Yes
Appropriability regime
weak.
:I Yes
Specialized asset
critical.
i Yes
Cash position OK.
Contract for
access.
Contract for
access.
Contract for
access.
Contract for
access.
Yes
Imitators / Competitors Contract for
better positioned. 1 access.
No
Integrate.
Figure 13 - Make / Buy Flowchart based on Technology Criterion
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(8) Plant Capacity
Many manufacturers find outsourcing a good way to deal with demand fluctuations, without
investing in additional plant capacity. See Figure 14 below.
Figure 14 - Outsourcing as a method of dealing with demand fluctuations.
Two sample manufacturing strategies are illustrated herein:
1. Manufacturing capacity level 1 is maintained in-house, and the remaining volume is supplied
through contract manufacturers (shaded in light blue).
2. Manufacturing capacity level 2 is maintained in-house, and is the maximum available
volume, since no manufacturing is outsourced.
In these examples it is evident that, if outsourcing is feasible, a lower manufacturing capacity
level can be maintained, which saves fixed costs. The added flexibility achieved through
outsourcing is expressed in the ability to meet demand despite low capacity and despite demand
fluctuations. Note that resource utilization would typically be higher in the fist scenario.
The caveat presented by low-volume production, however, is that this multi-sourced solution is
often not feasible, and the make / buy decision is more of a binary decision. In such cases, the
plant capacity criterion herein makes sense only if volumes can be aggregated among product
lines or otherwise divided between sources.
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4. Evaluation of Alternative Solutions
Core Competency Alternative Solution Alternative Solution Sourcing
Assessment Analysis Evaluation Decision
At this point, we are dealing with a function or component that is not a core competency, and we
have analyzed the key criteria regarding the sourcing alternatives for this function. Now, we must
evaluate the various alternatives, in order to make a wise sourcing decision. Although this process
usually involves more art than science, a decision support tool can be useful for displaying the
key findings of the previous analysis in a straightforward manner. To that extent, visual
presentation of all criteria and alternatives in a condensed format is recommended. The table
suggested in Figure 15 is an example of such a tool, this one using a weighted average, an
arbitrarily chosen calculation method that can be used for a decision support.
In this example, there are three feasible sourcing solutions for non-core component X. These are
dubbed Solution A, Solution B, and Solution C. Each sourcing solution was evaluated according
to the financial, operational, and strategic criteria described above, and the relative importance of
each criterion to that component was assessed as well. If a criterion was deemed utterly irrelevant
for Component X, no further solution evaluation by that criterion was necessary. Furthermore, if
a sourcing solution posed an insurmountable problem when considering a particular criterion, the
entire sourcing solution was rejected. Finally, a weighted average calculation, consisting of a sum
of solution evaluations multiplied by their respective importance scores, is presented.
When evaluating the various alternatives, one must not get "hung up" on arriving at an accurate,
high-resolution score for each. In the absence of the ability to arrive at a score on a scale of 1-5,
for instance, one might use a more conceptual scale, such as "-", "0", and "+". Likewise, one
must not use this final table as a precise metric for determining sourcing decisions. As stated in
IV. 1.b Model Overview, the model presented herein is a conceptual model, and results should be
evaluated with this in mind.
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Capital Budgeting 32
Ecookis orSa4 4 52
Focus 5 5 4 2
Coentrol
Employees 242
Tmre to Mreti 5 3 4
TIg r " 4 3 3
Tnentoloy Statg 4.32
Figure 15 - Example of an alternative evaluation table, based on weighted average scores
19 Since capital investment is not an issue regarding function X, there is no need to calculate
solution scores for this criterion.
20 In this example, the control criterion is a "show-stopper" for solution A. Thus, despite
otherwise high scores, A cannot be chosen, and the scores in this column may be disregarded.21 The weighted average is the sum of the importance scores multiplied by the benefit scores,
divided by the sum of the importance scores. Though solution B has the highest weighted
average, the show-stopping score of the "control" variable suggests using solution A, with the
next-highest score.
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5. Sourcing Decision
Core Competency Alternative Solution Alternative Solution Sourcing
Assessment Analysis Evaluation Decision
On the one hand, reaching a sourcing decision based solely on these numbers would be a grave
mistake. On the other hand, though, overlooking, underestimating, or overestimating, any of the
above criteria can also lead to decisions that are misaligned with corporate strategy. The main
objective of the model is to provide a framework that will help surface the issues that may deem
outsourcing infeasible or sway the sourcing decision in a particular direction, whether it be make
or buy.
To that extent, all core competencies, which directly contribute to unique customer value in a
sustainable manner, should stay in-house. The residual components or functions are candidates
for outsourcing, and should be considered separately, as described above. Separate consideration
of these factors provides a "feeling" for the important criteria for leaving a component in-house
or outsourcing it. However, in reality, we are dealing with a complex system, and pure
optimization or even prioritization may prove to be an insurmountable task. The main reason for
this is that each component of the product component hierarchy does not constitute an
independent decision. More often than not, the sourcing decision of one component affects the
decision criteria of that of another component. This being the case, evaluation of each component
and criterion separately provides a conceptual model, and not a precise, optimal solution. It
remains up to the manager to reach a business decision, based on these data. The model merely
provides a tool for accumulating those data and presenting them in a manner that supports this
decision process.
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V. Conclusions and Analysis
Initial implementation of this model is currently being conducted at Compaq Computer
Corporation's High Performance Server Business Unit (HPSBU), in order to determine which
components of the Miracle series Alpha Servers should be outsourced and which should remain
in-house.
Using this model, Compaq personnel view the Alpha Server system as a final deliverable, and
have mapped every function that leads to system delivery as a component, whether tangible or
intangible. Moreover, through model implementation, Compaq has identified several core
competencies - components that provide unique customer value in a sustainable manner. Initial
analysis of non-core competencies has surfaced several issues regarding the feasibility and
benefits of outsourcing these functions, in comparison to manufacturing them in-house. Much
additional work is necessary in order to complete this procedure according to the model described
herein, and analyze each criterion for each sourcing alternative of each non-core component that
is manufactured in-house. Such teamwork could very well be achieved by a future LFM intern
together with a dedicated group of Compaq personnel.
Unfortunately, the timing of this project was a little late. Before significant headway in the model
implementation could be achieved, a corporate decision was made to terminate the internal design
of the Alpha chip - the key component of the Alpha Server responsible for much of Alpha's
superior performance ratings. Instead, all future Alpha Servers designed after theMiracle series
will be based on Intel Corporation's Itanium processor, which, with this announcement, became
the de-facto industry standard, competing only with Sun Microsystems' proprietary processor
platform.
Using the model presented herein, Compaq personnel could have seen the impact that the Alpha
chip design component had on providing unique customer value. Assuming the design of the
Alpha chip was a core competency, it would have been a mistake to let this competitive
advantage fall into the hands of competition. Assuming this component was not a core
competency, the model could have provided a useful tool to assess the feasibility and benefits of
the various sourcing alternatives. In any case, many of the issues involved in outsourcing a
critical component such as this would have surfaced by utilizing the model presented herein.
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Similarly, numerous sourcing decisions will have to be made now that Hewlett-Packard
Corporation has announced that it will acquire Compaq Computer Corporation. Fortunately, next
time such a sourcing decision needs to be made, management at Compaq, "HewPaq", or whatever
the name of the future entity is, will be armed with a new framework for making sourcing
decisions regarding low-volume, high-complexity products, such as the Alpha Server.
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Appendix 1: Capital Budgeting Example2 2
Discounted Cash Flows (DCF)
Suppose we have a project that costs $120 in year 0. The project is expected to produce the
following revenues and costs:
I J $IUU $b1UU $ I)U $2u I
To compute the net present value (NPV), we need to compute free cash flows (FCF). In this
example, we will assume the tax rate is 40% and the discount rate is 10%.
jI
5.401 Finance Theory I"22 Strahan, Philip. Notes from "1
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Real Options
The DCF approach to making investment decisions assumes that firms are locked into their
investment with no opportunity to change as circumstances evolve. However, in reality, firms
have real options, for instance:
" Growth option: Expand the scale of a project if things go well.
" Abandonment option: Shrink a project or abandon it if things go badly.
Real options are valuable, since they lower the risk involved in a project, and thus raise the
market value of investments.
Example of a growth option
Imagine a $150M R&D investment in a new drug with a 50% chance of very successful
development, generating $200 million in FCF forever and a 50% chance of limited success, worth
$50 million forever. It costs an additional $500 million to develop the drug next year. Assuming a
discount rate of 20%, standard DCF analysis gives us a negative net present value, thereby
suggesting project rejection:
_ 500 0.5 x 200 +0.5 x 50 -- 45.84NPV =-150 - +=-.8
1.2 (0.2) x 1.2
However, by incorporating the growth option, things start to look better. We start by putting
ourselves in our own shoes next year, when we face the decision to develop the drug.
Next Year NPV
Good State NPV 200 -500 500
0.2
Bad State NPV - 50 - 500 -250
0.2
In conclusion, next year we will choose not to invest the additional $500 if the bad state occurs,
and the net present value is really:
0.5x500 0.5x200NPV = -150 - + = $58.34
1.2 (0.2) x 1.2
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Example of an abandonment option
Imagine a project pays $180 million under good economic conditions (50% probability) and $60
million in bad times. The discount rate is 20% and the risk-free rate is 8%. Using DCF to value
the project:
0.5 x 180 +0.5 x 60 1 0 0
project 1.2
Now, suppose you can buy insurance that will pay $100 in the bad state. The DCF calculation of
the value of this policy fails, because we do not know which discount rate to use: 20% or 8%. In
order to factor this policy into the project value, we consider the project with the insurance as
riskless. Thus,
180PV .80 = $166.67project +insurance 1 0 8
and the policy itself is worth $66.67.
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Appendix 2: Initial Model Implementation
Initial model implementation has been conducted at Compaq's HPSBU with regard to the Miracle
platform of Alpha Servers. Figure 16 presents the current status of project implementation (model
flowchart is identical to that shown in Figure 8, with added indication of Compaq implementation
status).
Analyze components
of finished product
Product components
defined as a hierarchy
Is the component V/ Yes
a core
competency?
No
In process
Analyze alternative
sourcing solutions
Evaluate alternative
sourcing solutions
Sourcing decision
Figure 16 - Flowchart of overall sourcing model process, with indication of completed model
implementation
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Core Competency Assessment
Core Competency Alternative Solution Alternative Solution Sourcing
Assessment Analysis Evaluation Decision
A high-level product component hierarchy is presented, with lower-level hierarchies
corresponding to each block within.
Miracle Product Component Hierarchy
Manufacturing Component Hierarchy
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Engineering Component Hierarchy
Customer Service and Support Component Hierarchy
Customization Component Hierarchy
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I
Software development Component Hierarchy
+
Test and Qualification Component Hierarchy
Core system hardware Component Hierarchy
I 1-i
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I I
I i
Optional hardware Component Hierarchy
After laying out the entire product component hierarchy above, the Compaq team proceeded to
analyze each component, looking for core competencies. This was based on comprehensive
customer satisfaction and benchmarking data taken from the marketing department. Components
that were thought to contribute to distinguishable customer value that could be sustained over
time were considered core competencies. These were later denoted, on the product component
hierarchy diagrams themselves, according to the following, simple and visually clear legend:
= Core Competency
X ==Non-Core Competency
Next to each core/non-core indicator, a brief explanation of the decision was also noted. Non-core
components were not analyzed or expanded further at this stage. Core competencies were
expanded as deeply as possible, until it was clear precisely which sub-components provided the
sustainable, unique, competitive advantage, and which could, potentially, be outsourced.
Alternative Solutions for Non-Core Functions
Core Competency Alternative Solution Alternative Solution Sourcing
Assessment Analysis Evaluation Decision
Further analysis of sourcing alternatives for non-core components is currently being performed,
in order to determine which of the non-core components can be outsourced, and which cannot. To
that extent, it seems that many non-core components that have not yet been outsourced really
should not be, due to issues that each stem from one of the restricting criteria listed in IV.3
Alternative Solutions for Non-Core Functions.
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Alternative Solution Evaluation and Sourcing Decision
Core Competency Alternative Solution Alternative Solution Sourcing
Assessment Analysis Evaluation Decision
However, some non-core components with viable sourcing alternatives are being uncovered, and,
hopefully, will be successfully outsourced. Through a rigorous, structured decision process, such
as that presented herein, managerially correct, albeit not necessarily mathematically optimal,
sourcing decisions can be reached.
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